The market you're describing does not fit well at all with high school recruiting and the transfer portal. The players have all the leverage and it's more akin to free agency then what they were doing in Moneyball. If another team has a player with a skillset that is more valuable then the team realizes you can't just go and acquire that player.
Some players have a lot of leverage. Some players have some leverage. But it’s a minority of players in the portal that have any leverage.
And thanks to the portal, high school recruits have a lot less leverage. Even we’re seeing that as we’re eyeing players in the portal over high school recruits.
On this forum, people mix the phrase “moneyball” with a lot of other concepts, like using disruptive or unconventional schemes. They can be related, but they’re not the same thing, and you can have one without the other. They do get used together sometimes because if you use smaller slot backs or heavier fullback-type players, you’ll take advantage of market inefficiencies (how many teams are looking for fullbacks?).
In the vein of not following the herd in order to open up more possibilities: On defense, the 4-2-5 is the most popular defense right now. If you run a 3-4 or a 3-3-5, you’re going to be looking for a different kind of linebacker than most teams prize (though a lot of teams are looking for “edge” players). It’s not even that unconventional a defense, but it allows you to avoid going toe-to-toe with everybody else. There are other schemes that can be disruptive, but also have the advantage that they allow you to take advantage of less prized players. The 3-4 isn’t moneyball, but it works well with a moneyball strategy. When everyone runs a 3-4, you lose the market advantage.
Also, while moneyball uses analytics, that doesn’t mean that using analytics == moneyball. For the A’s, the idea of moneyball was that scouts were missing value and focusing on the wrong players. “The central premise of Moneyball is that the collective wisdom of baseball insiders (including players, managers, coaches, scouts, and the
front office) over the past century is outdated, subjective, and often flawed.” In the case of the A’s, they thought AT THE TIME there was too much emphasis on stolen bases and too little on on base percentage.
The key is that you’re finding a niche where you have an advantage because everyone else is following the herd. The other guy is investing based on the wrong things.
There’s always a marketplace of players, and when there’s a marketplace there are going to be players overvalued and undervalued. That’s going to happen even if you’re playing the game the same way everyone else is, but if you play the game differently than others do then you can find even more advantages.
Now, if we are going to go for a purer moneyball view of things and get people riled up by bringing up the flexbone, it’s a good example of moneyball. Most fans, when they look at offense, think that total yards or total points are the measures of how good an offense is. The way we used to play the flexbone was with a focus on efficiency, or on EPA/play. Hold on to the ball, get first downs, have a high success rate. Our A-backs weren’t a traditional slot receiver or a traditional RB, but they got yards for us (and TDs). We just weren’t that inventive on defense. But, I think if you focus on the right stats (like success rate, in this case), you can say that the collective wisdom of football insiders is wrong and we should focus more on success rate for our offensive and defensive schemes and the players we recruit.
That involves using our players differently, and possibly focusing on “possession receivers” above the players with the right height/weight/speed profile. For example, It’s possible that Collins overemphasized speed vs. “good hands” because long TDs show up on the highlights, but lots of 5-yard receptions win ball games.